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Over the years the urban development financing tool known as Tax Increment
Finance (TIF) has been a controversial topic as it relates to fiscal impacts on school
districts. This study addresses an important question related to this issue. Does TIF
affect non-TIF district property value within the school district? The question is explored
by developing a theoretical model that describes the relationship between TIF and school
finance and estimating an empirical model that tests the hypotheses stemming from the
theoretical model. Although the results are mixed, there is some evidence that TIF does
affect non-TIF district property value in the school district.
The theoretical model describes the spillover effect of TIF on non-TIF district
property values, permitting non-linear spillover effects on the growth rate of non-TIF
district property values. Testable hypotheses that flow from this model indicate that at
lower levels of TIF intensity the spillover effect is positive, but at higher levels the
spillover effect is negative. This theoretical result leads to exploration of the optimal TIF
intensity that maximizes the positive spillover effect.
Using data from Minnesota school districts for the years 1992 through 2007, I
estimate the relationship between non-TIF district property value growth for school
districts and a measure of TIF intensity. Five regressions have statistically significant
results supporting the theoretical model‟s testable hypotheses. Using the coefficient

estimates from estimated equations, the optimal TIF intensity was 21 percent in 1993, 15
percent in 1996, 10 percent in 2000, eight percent in 2002, and six percent in 2003.
These results indicate that over time the optimal TIF intensity decreased. Consequently,
TIF positive spillover effects appear to have dissipated over time. The actual average
TIF intensity of the school districts over these years was generally well below the
estimated optimal values and has been decreasing over time. Based on average TIF
intensities, it appears that during these years most school districts in Minnesota have
benefited from positive spillover effects on non-TIF district property value.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Economic development is essential for local communities to thrive and in some
cases survive. Local government benefits from development through a higher property
tax base which generates more tax revenue. State government can encourage economic
development through legislation that provides an economic development financing tool.
One financing tool that most states have passed into law is Tax Increment Finance (TIF).
TIF allows cities to improve infrastructure in blighted areas without raising tax rates or
taking tax revenue from other municipal expenditures. The infrastructure improvement is
intended to attract economic development that would not have occurred otherwise.
As its name implies, TIF is financed by tax increments. Prior to improvement,
property value within the TIF district is recorded and referred to as fixed, or frozen,
property value. As property value increases due to the improvement, the TIF authority
captures tax revenue generated from the difference between the frozen value and the new,
higher property value. The increase in property value is referred to as the capture and the
tax revenue generated from the capture is referred to as the tax increment. The tax
increment is used to pay for TIF.
Typically, the city issues bonds to raise the initial revenue to pay for TIF. The
revenue raised from these bonds is used to pay for the costs associated with the
infrastructure improvement. Each year, the tax increment is used to retire a portion of the
bonds. The TIF district is active until all of the bonds are retired. Through this process,
the infrastructure improvement is self-financing (see Dye and Sundberg 1998 p 91; Dye
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and Merriman 2000 p 309; and Weber 2003 p 622 for additional descriptions of this
process).
Overlapping jurisdictions, such as counties and school districts, collect tax
revenue from the frozen value during the life of the TIF district, which can range from a
few years to a few decades. When the TIF district expires, overlapping jurisdictions are
no longer restricted to collecting tax revenue from the frozen property value and they
once again have access to the total property value.
The effect of TIF on the school district is of particular interest because the school
district typically receives the largest share of property tax revenue (McGuire and Papke
2008 p 357). Opponents of TIF argue that city officials have abused TIF and used it in
areas that would have developed without TIF, capturing revenue that would have gone to
the school district (Dye and Sundberg 1998). Proponents of TIF argue that TIF does not
take revenue away from the school district because the revenue would not have been
available without the infrastructure improvement (Lawrence and Stephenson 1995 p
106). Most states‟ TIF legislation require a TIF district to be established in a blighted
area that would not be developed “but for” TIF. Proponents add that the school district
has access to a higher property tax base when the TIF district expires.
Even if TIF does not take revenue away from the school district, the school
district could still be adversely affected if economic development attracts more students.
As the number of students increases, the school district may need to hire more teachers
and expand facilities (Weber 2003 p 625). To pay for these additional costs, the school
district would have to raise its tax rate and collect more tax revenue from property
outside of the TIF district. This would impose an additional financial burden on
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taxpayers within the school district but outside the TIF district (Lehnen and Johnson 2001
p 151). If the number of students and expenditures both increase, and the school district
raises the tax rate, expenditures per pupil could remain the same. Otherwise, if the school
district is not willing to raise the tax rate, expenditures per pupil would decrease. Either
way, the school district is faced with a difficult financial decision.
It is also possible for TIF to positively or negatively affect non-TIF district
property value (Skidmore, Merriman, and Kashian 2009). If the infrastructure
improvement attracts additional economic development outside the TIF district, total
property value would increase and more tax revenue would be available for the school
district. This would allow the school district to either increase expenditures per pupil or
decrease the tax rate. Conversely, TIF could take economic development away from
other areas of the school district, decreasing the school district‟s tax base. This would
decrease the school district‟s tax revenue during the life of the TIF district. This would
force the school district to either decrease expenditures per pupil or increase the tax rate.
Two important questions arise from the preceding scenarios. First, does TIF
affect non-TIF district property value within the school district? If it does, then TIF alters
the school district‟s tax revenue during the life of the TIF district. Second, does TIF
affect expenditures per pupil? If more TIF causes expenditures per pupil to decline, then
the educational output of the school district declines during the life of the TIF district.
However, if more TIF causes expenditures per pupil to increase, then the educational
output of the school district increases during the life of the TIF district. Answering these
questions will provide much needed insight into the effect of TIF on school districts.
This paper explores these questions by developing a theoretical model that describes the
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relationship between TIF and school finance and an empirical model that tests the
hypotheses from the theoretical model. Before developing the model, it is important to
learn about how school finance and TIF work and review the research on this
relationship.
Chapter 2 provides a background of school finance and TIF in the United States.
It describes the establishment and evolution of school finance, equity issues in school
finance, and state school finance programs. It includes a history of TIF and an overview
of the current state of TIF from data I collected from each state. The data show the extent
that it is used and reveal that Midwestern states use TIF more than any other region. For
example, in 2006 there were currently over 2,000 TIF districts in Minnesota. Because of
the rich data available in Minnesota, I use it for empirical estimation.
Chapter 3 includes summaries of previous studies from the School Finance
literature and TIF literature. Some studies look at the relationship between TIF and
property values but few look at the relationship between TIF and school finance. Of the
theoretical models, little focus is given specifically to TIF‟s effect on school finance.
Only recently have researchers empirically examined this relationship. These studies
look at the effect of TIF on property tax revenue, state revenue, and the school district‟s
tax rate. However, these empirical models are not motivated by theoretical models.
In Chapter 4, I develop a theoretical model that describes the spillover effect of
TIF on the growth rate of non-TIF district property values. This model is an extension of
theoretical models in two previous studies (Brueckner 2001 and Skidmore, Merriman,
and Kashian 2009). The TIF variable is defined as TIF intensity, which is similar to the
TIF intensity variables used in two previous empirical studies (Weber 2003 and Weber,
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Hendrick, and Thompson 2008). The testable hypotheses that flow from this model are
based on the assumption that TIF intensity creates a non-linear spillover effect on the
growth rate of non-TIF district property values. First, at lower levels of TIF intensity, the
spillover effect is positive, and second, while at higher levels of TIF intensity, the
spillover effect is negative.
In Chapter 5, I use data from Minnesota to empirically test the hypotheses of the
theoretical model. These hypotheses are tested by estimating the parameters of an
empirical model using data from school districts in Minnesota. I estimate the relationship
between non-TIF district property value growth for school districts and TIF intensity for
the years 1992 through 2007. The estimation provides statistically significant results that
support these hypotheses.
Chapter 6 contains policy implications for Minnesota as well as other states.
Policymakers should be aware of the potential non-linear effect of TIF on overall
property value growth within the school district. This is especially important in trying to
determine the effect of TIF on school finance.
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Chapter 2
Background of School Finance and Tax Increment Finance
In the United States, school finance dates back several centuries while TIF dates
back only several decades. For most of its history, school finance has been a local
responsibility. This has changed in recent years as equity concerns have risen due to
large disparities across school districts. TIF has also been scrutinized recently due to its
uncertain effect on school districts. As TIF becomes more popular across the United
States, interest in this relationship is sure to continue.
The Establishment and Evolution of School Finance
The relationship between property values and school finance in the United States
can be traced back to President Thomas Jefferson in late eighteenth century. Jefferson
proposed government funding for primary education and private funding for secondary
education (Lindert 2004). In 1779, he introduced a bill, “calling for a statewide system of
free public elementary schools to be paid for by local taxpayers” (Lindert 2004 p 11).
Each of the three times the bill was introduced, it was defeated by property owners who
were concerned about the tax implications of a public education system. Eventually,
landowners realized that a high-quality public education system could increase the value
of their land, and they became less resistant to public education. By the 1850s,
policymakers developed a system for financing education that included a combination of
local and state funding (Springer, Houck, and Guthrie 2008 p 7), with property taxes
being the main source of local funding. For the next century, local revenue was the main
revenue source for public education and school districts were primarily autonomous.
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In the twentieth century, education finance began to change. From 1900 through
1930 the local share of total funding for education was over 80 percent but in the 1950s it
was less than 60 percent (Springer, Houck, and Guthrie 2008 p 7). It gradually fell
during the last half of the twentieth century and in 2000 the local share was down to 40
percent (McGuire and Papke 2008 p 360). In the 1950s the property tax was 46 percent
of total revenue and by 2000 it decreased to 28 percent (McGuire and Papke 2008 p 360).
While the local government‟s share began to decrease in the 1930s, the state and
federal governments‟ shares both increased. The federal government‟s share of school
finance increased from under one percent in the early 1900s to nine percent in 1980 and
fell to seven percent in 2000 (Gordon 2008 p 297). The state‟s share of education was 20
percent at the beginning of the twentieth century and by the end of the century it
accounted for approximately half (Springer, Houck, and Guthrie 2008 p 7). It remains to
be seen if state revenue will continue to replace local revenue.
Equity Issues of School Finance
When school districts were collecting most of their revenue from local sources,
they were restricted to the tax capacity of their property tax base. Because tax revenue
was highly correlated with district wealth, poorer school districts could not provide the
same quality of education as wealthy school districts. This caused variations in
expenditures per pupil across school districts. States felt pressure to “equalize
differences in the property tax-raising capacity of their school districts” and “provide
local property tax relief” (Picus, Goertz, and Odden 2008). During the latter part of the
twentieth century, the legality of a decentralized system was challenged in several states.1

1

For an extensive list of cases, see Yinger 2004 p 387.
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Since then, states began to adopt a more centralized method of school finance where
school districts provide revenue but the state “must carry the fiscal burden of such
provision if local governments cannot” (Lukemeyer, 2004 p 72). This helps to explain
the shift from local to state funding during the later part of the twentieth century.
State School Finance Programs
States generally use one of two methods to finance education, foundation aid and
guaranteed tax base (also known as the power-equalizing aid program). 2 Under
foundation aid, states determine the amount of revenue each school district needs to
provide what it deems an adequate level of education and subtracts the amount of revenue
the school district can generate from its property value. The state provides the difference
in aid. With the guaranteed tax base, state aid equals the difference between a statedetermined property tax revenue and the school district‟s actual property tax revenue
multiplied by the school district‟s tax rate (Yinger 2004 p 12).
Under both methods, state aid is a function of the local government‟s ability to
pay. The lower the school district‟s property tax base, the higher the state aid. If concern
about property-based finance persists, states may change these formulas to exclude
property value.
The History of Tax Increment Finance
Originally referred to as tax “allocation” funding, TIF was first implemented in
California in 1952 (Huddleston 1984 p 11). TIF appealed to state governments because it
allowed them to address economic development needs in blighted areas that cities may

2

Forty-one states use foundation aid (Yinger 2004 p 16). Thirty use it alone and eleven supplement it with
other aid (Yinger 2004 p 337).
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have ignored due to “incentives inherent in the existing property tax system” (Huddleston
1981 p 373). Some cities would forgo development because they could not bear the
entire development cost. TIF provided a way for overlapping jurisdictions to shoulder
the financial burden of development. Some examples of early TIF projects include “the
purchasing and clearing of land, improving streets, providing infrastructure, servicing
debt, and so forth” (Huddleston 1984 p 12).
As funding for local economic development from federal and state government
decreased (Dye and Sundberg 1998), TIF became a popular method of funding. By 1982,
twenty-eight states employed TIF (Cohen 1982) and by 1993, TIF was legal in at least
forty-four states (Forgey 1993). As of 2007, forty-nine states had TIF legislation
(Petersen 2007).
Though most states have approved some form of TIF, each state administers it
differently. For example, some require a state agency to be involved in the adoption
process while others give local government complete control. In some states, local
government is responsible for funding infrastructure improvements while others require
businesses to initially finance it and are later reimbursed by the city. Regardless of
procedural differences, TIF is intended to promote economic development within the
state.
Initially, the TIF adoption decision was made by the municipality, even though it
impacted overlapping jurisdictions. Sometimes these jurisdictions were included in the
TIF adoption discussion but they were excluded from making the TIF adoption decision.
Over time, states let overlapping jurisdictions have a louder voice in the process, and
some states have even allowed school districts to participate in the TIF adopting decision.
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In a few states, school districts can decline to let their revenue be part of the tax
increment. For example, in Michigan, the tax increment is only permitted to include
school district revenue for environmental cleanup projects (Lehnen and Johnson 2001 p
140).
The Current State of Tax Increment Finance
Although TIF has been used for over half a century in the United States, it is
difficult to determine the current state of TIF. Records are kept locally and most states
do not require local governments to report information to the state. Also, it can be
difficult to identify a state agency that is familiar with TIF activity within the state.
Unavailable data may explain why previous overviews of TIF are limited. A few
studies have indicated which states had TIF legislation (Cohen 1982, Forgey 1993) and a
few have summarized legislation by state (Johnson and Kriz 2001, Council of
Development Finance Authorities 2008), but no previous study identifies the extent that
TIF is used by each state. In order to fill this gap and determine the current state of TIF
in the United States, I collected data from each state regarding TIF use, when TIF
legislation was passed, and if a state agency oversees TIF.
Data were primarily collected by contacting local and state government agencies
involved with TIF in each state. A state contact or agency was identified in 30 states but
the level of involvement by each agency varies by state. For example, some states have
established separate entities that oversee and collect data on each TIF district while others
include TIF administration within an existing government entity. Table 2.1 provides a
national overview of TIF by reporting the year a state adopted TIF legislation, an
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estimate of the current number of TIF districts within the state, and a contact or reference
for TIF in each state.
Table 2.1
National Overview of TIF by State

State
AK
AL
AR
AZ

Year TIF was
Passed into
Legislation
1988
1987
2000
na

Estimated
Number of
TIF
Districts
0
< 10
10 - 20
na

CA

1952

771 a
b

State Contact or Reference

Department of Economic Development
State Controller's Office

CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
HI

1974
1994
2003
1977
1985
1985

42
<5
0
173
< 15
0

Department of Local Affairs, State Auditor's Office
Connecticut Development Authority

IA
ID
IL
IN
KS
KY
LA
MA
MD
ME
MI

1969
1988
1977
1975
1976
2000
1988
2003
1980
1977
1980

949 c
50
1000
126
4
7
5 - 10
2
> 18
> 200
88 b

Department of Management

Department of Revenue, Department of Community Affairs

Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity, Office of Comptroller
Department of Local Government Finance
Cabinet for Economics Development
Office of Budget Management, Economic Assistance Coordinating Council
Department of Economic and Community Development
State Tax Commission, Department of Treasury, Economic Development
Corporation
Department of Revenue and Office of the State Auditor

MN

1979

2184

MO
MS
MT
NC
ND

1984
1986
1978
2004
1989

263 a
150
20 - 22
0
10

NE
NH
NJ
NM
NV
NY
OH
OK

1978
1979
2002
1978
1987
1984
1987
1992

398 a
6-7
0
2-3
> 50
2
747
25

State Property Tax Administrator

OR
PA
RI
SC
SD

1960
1990
1984
1984
1978

75 e
> 100
2
100
74

Department of Revenue, State Treasury

TN

2004

20 - 30 d

TX
UT
VA

1987
1968
1988

82 f
51
3

Department of Economic Development
Development Authority
Department of Revenue
Local Government Commission

Local Finance Board
Local Government Finance, Department of Taxation
State Comptroller
Office of Tax Incentives, Department of Development

Department of Revenue
Comptroller of the Treasury
State Comptroller
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Table 2.1 (Continued)
National Overview of TIF by State

State
VT
WA
WI
WV
WY

Year TIF was
Passed into
Legislation
1985
2001
1975
2002
1983

Estimated
Number of
TIF
Districts
<6
3
818
11
5 - 10

State Contact or Reference
Department of Taxes
Department of Revenue
Department of Revenue
West Virginia Development Office

If the state does not have TIF districts, the numbers are estimates of the following: a: projects, b: authorities, c: areas, d: projects
and districts, e: plan areas, f: zones

The first variable listed in Table 2.1 is the year that each state passed TIF enabling
legislation. These data were obtained from the date on the state statute, the state contact
or agency, or from a secondary source (e.g. existing literature). The next variable in
Table 2.1 is the estimated number of TIF districts within the state. 3 In most cases a state
contact or agency provided data on the number of TIF districts. In other cases, if a state
contact or agency could not be identified, estimates were obtained from persons familiar
with TIF in the state, such as an attorney or a local government official. Because most
states do not track each TIF district and therefore do not know exactly how many TIF
districts are in the state, this number is not necessarily the exact number of districts
currently in the state. Rather, this number is intended as an approximate reflection of the
general use of TIF within each state. Lastly, Table 2.1 also provides information for the
state contact or agency where available.

3

Not all states call TIF locations, “districts;” alternate identities are indicated at the bottom of Table 1. In
addition, although most states only allow property taxes, some states allow alternate sources of funding
such as a sales tax; no distinction for alternate sources of funding is made in this study.
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Although TIF was initially used in the 1950s, it took several decades before it
became widely accepted. Table 2.14 shows that prior to 1960 only one state had codified
TIF and during the 1960s only three states passed TIF legislation. In the 1970s and
1980s, TIF legislation was adopted by 13 and 20 states respectively. During the 1990s
three states adopted TIF legislation and since 2000 nine of the remaining 10 states have
adopted TIF legislation. Today, 49 states have TIF legislation. This is likely due to the
decrease in federal and state funding for local economic development (Huddleston 1986;
Dye and Sundberg 1998).
Table 2.1 also includes the estimated number of TIF districts in each state, which
ranges from zero to 2,184. 5 Five states have TIF enabling legislation but have not used it
or are not currently using it. Fifteen states have between one and 10 TIF districts and
nine states have between 11 and 50. Seven states have between 51 and 100 TIF districts
and 13 states have between 101 and 2,184 TIF districts. This variation in TIF utilization
is due to several factors. First, legislation, which differs by state, can be confusing and
cumbersome, deterring local governments from using TIF. Also, some states have
different alternatives available for funding infrastructure improvements and some state
agencies promote TIF more than others. Finally, fear of lawsuits has discouraged some
local governments from pursuing TIF.

4

In some cases the year in Table 1 may not corroborate the results of previous studies. This is most likely
due to ambiguity in the way TIF is defined and from changes in legislation over time. Links to all TIF
statutes can be found at www.cdfa.net.
5
For states with a range for the estimated number of TIF districts, I used the average of the range and states
with less than or greater than a number, I used the number listed in the calculations. The correlation
coefficient between age and number of districts is -.36.
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Of the 12 states with the most TIF districts, all have state contacts. This is not
surprising because those states would want more oversight and need to provide assistance
to local governments, or want to collect data to determine the impact of TIF on the state.
Even though the extent to which TIF is used varies greatly across states, there are
similarities within geographic regions.
Table 2.2 gives summary statistics for the four geographic regions of the United
States as defined by the US Census. 6 It shows that all nine states in the Midwest employ
TIF. The average number of TIF districts in those states is 555 and one state has over
2000 TIF districts. In the other three regions, at least one state in each region has no TIF
districts. In the West, although one state has 771 TIF districts, the average is 89. States
in the Northeast and the South have had much lower TIF employment; the average in the
Northeast is 36 and the average is the South is 39.
One explanation for the variation in TIF utilization is the age of TIF legislation.
As seen in Table 2.2, states in the Midwest and the West have had TIF legislation much
longer, on average. In addition, states may become familiar with the economic
development tools used in neighboring states and feel pressure to adopt similar incentives
to attract business.

6

Census regions are defined as follows: Northeast includes CT, ME, MA, NH, RI, VT, NJ, NY, PA;
Midwest includes IN, IL, MI, OH, WI, IA, KS, MN, MO, NE, ND, SD; South includes DE, FL, GA, MD,
NC, SC, VA, WV, AL, KY, MS, TN, AR, LO, OK, TX; and the West includes AZ, CO, ID, NM, MT, UT,
NV, WY, AK, CA, HA, OR, WA

15
Table 2.2
Regional Overview of TIF
Region

Estimated Number of TIF Districts by Region

Midwest
Northeast
South
West

Average

Standard
Deviation

Median

Minimum

Maximum

Year TIF was Passed into
Legislation
Average

555
36
39
89

637
69
56
216

331
5
13
31

4
0
0
0

2184
200
173
771

1979
1989
1992
1979

Source: Petersen (2007)

As more information becomes available, Tables 2.1 and 2.2 can be expanded to
better evaluate TIF. For example, although knowing the number of TIF districts in each
state provides some information about the extent to which TIF is used, it does not reflect
the financial magnitude of the infrastructure improvements. Further work is needed to
find a more descriptive measure of TIF utilization such as the size measured in land area
or the size of the capture relative to the tax base.
School Finance and TIF
This chapter has described a major change in school finance during the last
several decades. In response to challenges to the school finance system, most states have
shifted to a centralized method of finance. Despite its decline, the property tax still
represents a significant component of school finance at more than a quarter of total
revenue. During this time, most states have also adopted TIF legislation to encourage
local economic development. TIF became especially popular in the Midwest. The next
chapter summarizes previous studies of the relationship between TIF and school finance.
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Chapter 2 Appendix TIF by State
During 2006 data were primarily collected by contacting local and state government
agencies involved with TIF.
Alaska
Although TIF legislation was passed in 1988, it has not been employed and there
is no state agency that oversees it.
Legislation: Improvement Area Projects; Title 29, Chapter 47, Section 460 (Debt
for Improvement Area Projects)
Alabama
Codified in 1987, TIF is used sparingly in Alabama. There is no state agency that
oversees TIF and therefore no data is available. Although there is no count of the
number of TIF districts in Alabama, it is estimated that there are less than ten.
Legislation: Tax Increment Districts; Title 11, Subtitle 3, Chapter 99
Arkansas
TIF was passed into legislation in 2000 and amended in 2005. The new
legislation requires Redevelopment Districts to file with the Department of
Economic Development. The number of estimated districts is between ten and
twenty.
Legislation: Community Redevelopment; Title 14, Subtitle 10, Chapter 168,
Subchapter 3
Arizona
TIF is not legal in Arizona.
California
California was the first state to codify TIF in 1952. Between 2001 and 2005 there
were 771 projects areas. The California State Controllers Office collects and
publishes select data annually.
Legislation: Community Redevelopment Law; Chapter 1, Article 1, 33000
Colorado
TIF was first enacted in 1974 and has since been divided into two categories,
Urban Renewal Authorities and Downtown Authorities. There are 42 TIF
districts. Although districts are required to report annually to the Department of
Local Affairs and the State Auditor‟s Office, data is not available.
Legislation: Urban Renewal Law; Title 31, Article 25, Part 1
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Connecticut
TIF was passed into legislation in 1994. The Connecticut Development Authority
is minimally involved but does not keep record of TIF districts. Legislation states
that, “no commitments for new projects shall be approved by the authority under
this section on or after July 1, 2005.”
Legislation: Tax Increment Financing Program; Title 32, Chapter 588n
Delaware
TIF was codified in 2003 but there are no districts yet. There is no state
government agency that oversees TIF.
Legislation: Municipal Tax Increment Financing Act; Title 22, Chapter 17
Florida
TIF was codified in 1977. There are 173 districts but there is no overseeing
government agency.
Legislation: Community Redevelopment Act; Title 11, Chapter 163, Part III
Georgia
TIF was passed into legislation in 1985 but there is no overseeing government
agency. It is estimated that there are less than 15 TIF districts in the state.
Legislation: Redevelopment Power Law; Title 36, Chapter 44
Hawaii
TIF was passed into legislation in 1985. It is unclear how many TIF districts
there are or if there is an overseeing state agency.
Legislation: Tax Increment Financing Act; Division 1, Title 6, Subtitle 1, Chapter
46, Part IV
Iowa
TIF was legalized in 1969 and there are 949 TIF areas. Every other year TIF
areas are required to report their outstanding indebtedness to the Department of
Management.
Legislation: Urban Renewal Law; Title IX, Subtitle 4, Chapter 403
Idaho
TIF was codified in 1988. There is no government agency that oversees TIF so
data is not available. There are an estimated 35 TIF districts in Idaho. TIF is
growing in popularity so this number is expected to increase in the near future.
Legislation: Local Economic Development Act; Title 50, Chapter 29
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Illinois
TIF was codified in 1977 and reformed in 1999. In 2006 there were 1,000 TIF
districts. The Department of Commerce and Economic Opportunity is the state
agency that collects data on TIF districts annually. The Illinois Tax Increment
Association also has information on TIF in Illinois.
Legislation: Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act; Chapter 65, Article
11, Division 74.4
Indiana
TIF was passed into legislation in 1975. The Department of Local Government
Finance has minimal oversight. There are approximately 126 districts within the
state.
Legislation: Redevelopment Commissions; 36-7-Chapter 14
Kansas
Enacted in 1977, TIF has not been widely used in Kansas. It involves a lengthy
process and is usually only used in large-scale projects in cities with a large tax
base. TIF districts are divided into several sub-categories; some districts use
property taxes while others use sales taxes. There is no state agency that oversees
TIF. Four TIF districts are estimated to be active in Kansas in 2006.
Legislation: Development & Redevelopment of Areas In & Around Cities;
Chapter 12, Article 17
Kentucky
TIF legislation was passed in 2000 and has been amended several times since.
There are three government agencies that oversee TIF including the Office of
State Budget Director, the Finance Administration Cabinet, and the Revenue
Cabinet. The Cabinet for Economic Development also has information about
TIF. There are roughly six TIF districts but TIF is gaining in popularity because
of changes in legislation. Currently, districts are not required to report to the
state, but they will be required in the future.
Legislation: Increment Financing Act; Title IX, Chapter 65
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Louisiana
TIF was passed into legislation in 1988. There is no state government agency that
oversees TIF and it is not clear how many TIF districts are located in the state.
Legislation: Tax Increment Development Act; Title 47, Subtitle 9, Chapter 1
Massachusetts
District Improvement Financing (DIF) was passed in 2003 and is just beginning to
be utilized. The Massachusetts Economic Assistant Coordinating Council must
approve the projects. There are only 2 DIF projects thus far.
Legislation: District Improvement Financing; Part 1, Title VII, Chapter 40Q
Maryland
TIF was passed in 1980 but there is no government agency that oversees it so no
information is available on the districts.
Legislation: Tax Increment Financing Act; Article 41, Title 14, Subtitle 2
Maine
Department of Economic and Community Development oversees TIF and
collects some data on TIF districts.
Legislation: Tax Increment Financing; Title 30-A
Michigan
The first TIF Act was passed in 1980 but was replaced in 1984 with the
Downtown Authority Act and in 1987 the Local Development Finance Authority
was created to limit the scope of TIF. The Department of Treasury collects and
audits data on the TIF districts. There are 88 TIF authorities in Michigan, which
is the closest approximation of the number of TIF districts in the state.
Legislation: Tax Increment Financing Authority Act; Chapter 125
Minnesota
TIF was passed into legislation in 1979 and since then it has been used
extensively. In the 2003-04 fiscal year there were 2,184 TIF districts. TIF
districts are required to submit data to the Department of Revenue annually and
the TIF Division of the Office of the State Auditor was established in 2001 to
oversee and audit TIF districts.
Legislation: Tax Increment Financing; Chapter 469
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Missouri
TIF was codified in 1984 but didn‟t gain in popularity until the 1990s when
legislation was amended. Recently TIF districts have been required to report to
the Department of Economic Development. According to the 2005 Annual
Report, there are 263 TIF districts.
Legislation: Real Property Tax Increment Allocation Redevelopment Act; Title 7,
Chapter 99
Mississippi
TIF was codified in 1986. The Mississippi Development Authority Board
approves TIF districts but does not follow them over time so no data is available
on individual districts and a cumulative number is not available.
Legislation: Tax Increment Financing; Title 21, Chapter 45
Montana
TIF was codified in 1978. TIF districts are not required to report to a state agency
but the Department of Revenue corresponds with the TIF districts annually about
the property values in the district. The estimated number of TIF districts is
between 20 and 22.
Legislation: Urban Renewal Law; Title 7, Chapter 15, Part 42
North Carolina
TIF was passed into legislation in 2004 but there are no TIF districts yet. The
Local Government Commission approves the TIF districts and collects data
annually from each district.
Legislation: Project Development Financing Act; Chapter 159, Article 6
North Dakota
TIF was passed into legislation in 1989 but there is no overseeing government
agency. There are 10 TIF districts in the state.
Legislation: Urban Renewal Law; Title 40, Chapter 40-58
Nebraska
TIF was passed into legislation in 1978. Each city the uses TIF must file a report
annually with the State Property Tax Administrator. In 2005, there were 398 TIF
projects and data for each project is available in the annual Report to the
Legislature.
Legislation: Community Development Law; Chapter 18, Article 21
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New Hampshire
TIF was codified in 1979. There are approximately 6 or 7 TIF districts. TIF
districts are not required to report to any state agency so no data is available.
Legislation: Municipal Economic Development and Revitalization Districts; Title
XII, Chapter 162-K
New Jersey
TIF was passed into legislation via the Redevelopment Allocation District
Financing Act in 2002. The State‟s Finance Board oversees TIF but there are no
TIF districts.
Legislation: Revenue Allocation District Financing Act; Title 52, Subtitle 3,
Chapter 27D, Article 9
New Mexico
TIF was passed into legislation in 1978. It has only been used to create
approximately 2 or 3 TIF districts. Legislation passed in 2006 is intended to
encourage TIF districts in the future. There is currently no state agency that
oversees TIF in New Mexico.
Legislation: Urban Development Law; Chapter 3, Article 46
Nevada
Community Redevelopment Law was passed in 1959 but the redevelopment
districts were not defined until 1987. TIF districts, referred to as redevelopment
districts, are overseen by the Local Government Finance Section of the
Department of Taxation. There are over 50 redevelopment districts in Nevada.
Legislation: Community Redevelopment Law; Title 22, Chapter 279
New York
TIF was codified in 1984 and as of 2002 there were only two TIF districts. There
is no state agency that oversees TIF and no data is available.
Legislation: Municipal Redevelopment Law; Article 18-C
Ohio
It is estimated that TIF was passed into legislation in 1987 and that there are
approximately 747 districts. There are two types of districts: Parcel TIFs and
Incentive District TIFs. They report annually to the Department of Economic
Development.
Legislation: Municipal Tax Increment Financing; Title 57, Chapter 5709
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Oklahoma
TIF was adopted in 1992 but there is no government agency that oversees it and
there is no data available on the individual districts. An estimate of the number of
districts was not available. An Incentive Review Committee is being set up to
look into these issues.
Legislation: Local Development Act; Title 62, Chapter 9
Oregon
TIF was passed into legislation in 1960. TIF districts are referred to as „Urban
Renewal Plan Areas.‟ Each plan area reports to the Department of Revenue and
there were 75 plan areas in 2004.
Legislation: Urban Renewal Law; Chapter 457
Pennsylvania
TIF was passed into legislation in 1990. The only state involvement comes from
the Department of Community and Economic Development from the TIF
Guarantee Program that helps local governments fund the TIF districts. Data is
not available on individual TIF districts and the number of TIF districts is
estimated to be greater than 100.
Legislation: Tax Increment Financing Act; Title 53, Part I, Chapter 24D
Rhode Island
TIF legislation was passed in 1984. There is no state agency that oversees it so
data is not available. TIF has only been used a few times; it is estimated to be
only 2 TIF districts.
Legislation: Tax Increment Financing Act; Title 45, Chapter 33.2
South Carolina
TIF law was passed in 1984. The Municipal Association of South Carolina
corresponds with local government about TIF but there is no government agency
that oversees TIF. There are approximately 100 TIF districts in the state.
Legislation: Tax Increment Financing Law; Title 31, Chapter 6
South Dakota
TIF legislation was enacted in 1978. The Department of Revenue corresponds
with the counties about the property values in the TIF district. In 2005 there were
74 TIF districts.
Legislation: Tax Incremental Districts; Title 11, Chapter 11-9
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Tennessee
General TIF has been in the Tennessee legislation since 1945 but it was not until
2004 that legislation was amended to specifically promote TIF. There are several
TIF projects, but there are no TIF districts yet. There is no state agency that
oversees TIF.
Legislation: Redevelopment; Title 13, Chapter 20, Part 2
Texas
TIF was codified in 1987. TIF districts are referred to as Tax Increment
Reinvestment Zones. The State Comptroller publishes a Biennial Report that
contains data on each zone which is available online. For the 2003-04 fiscal year,
there were 82 zones.
Legislation: Tax Increment Financing Act; Title 3, Subtitle B, Chapter 311
Utah
It is estimated that the first Redevelopment Area was in 1968 an approximation of
when TIF was passed into legislation. It appears that there has not been a single
state agency that oversaw TIF in the past. In 2005, the Governor‟s Office of
Economic Development began establishing Economic Development Zones. The
best estimate of the number of TIF districts is 51, which is the number of projects
adopted since 1993.
Legislation: Redevelopment Agencies; Title 17B, Chapter 4, Part 1
Virginia
TIF became legal in 1988 but there are currently only about three TIF districts.
There is no state agency that oversees TIF.
Legislation: Tax Increment Financing; Title 58.1, Subtitle III, Chapter 32 Article
4.1
Vermont
TIF legislation was passed in 1985. There are probably no more than six TIF
districts in the state. TIF districts must be approved by the local and state
government. The Vermont Economic Progress Council is the state agency that
oversees TIF. The legislature is currently reviewing TIF legislation to expand its
use in Vermont.
Legislation: Tax Increment Financing; Title 24, Part 2, Chapter 53, Subchapter 5
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Washington
TIF was recently passed into legislation in 2001 and is currently being amended
to expand its use and make previous legislation more clear. There are only about
three TIF districts. Minimal oversight is provided by the Department of Revenue.
Legislation: Community Revitalization Financing; Title 39, Chapter 39.89
Wisconsin
TIF was codified in 1975. The Department of Revenue assists in creating TIF
districts, referred to as Tax Increment Districts, and collects data from each
district annually, which is available online. In 2005, 818 districts were active.
Legislation: Tax Increment Law; Chapter 66
West Virginia
TIF was passed in 2002. The West Virginia Development Office approves all TIF
projects and districts. As of 2006, there were 11 total TIF districts.
Legislation: West Virginia Tax Increment Financing Law; Appendix A, Article
11B
Wyoming
TIF was codified in 1983. There is no state agency that oversees TIF and it is
estimated that there are no more than 5 or 10 TIF districts in the state.
Legislation: Urban Renewal Code; Title 15, Chapter 9, Article 1; West Virginia
Tax Increment Financing Law, Appendix A, Article 11B
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Chapter 3
Previous Studies
This chapter reviews literature related to TIF and school finance. Despite
widespread interest in this relationship, few studies have addressed it explicitly. Perhaps
the main reason for this is the lack of accessible TIF data noted in the previous chapter.
Several papers examine expenditures per pupil and acknowledge the link between TIF
and school finance, but only recently has there been empirical evidence showing TIF‟s
effect on school finance. These studies just begin to describe this relationship. They
establish the foundation which this paper builds upon.
Empirical Papers
Researchers of school finance study different effects on expenditures per pupil
including age demographics (Poterba 1997, Berkman and Plutzer 2004) and income
(Hoxby 1998). Poterba (1997) finds that school districts with a larger elderly population
have lower expenditures per pupil, an effect that is magnified when the racial
composition of the elderly differs from that of the school-aged children. Berkman and
Plutzer (2004) decompose the elderly population in two groups, longlasting elderly and
migrant elderly. The authors find that school districts with more longstanding residents
lead to higher expenditures per pupil but school districts with a larger migrant elderly
population have lower expenditures per pupil. Hoxby (1998) finds that per capita income
and per-pupil valuation are important positive contributors to expenditures per pupil.
Other studies explore the effect of legislative changes on school finance, such as
the introduction of a state lottery (Campbell 2003) and centralizing school finance
(Anderson 1994, Zimmer and Jones 2005, Maher and Skidmore 2008). Campbell (2003)
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finds a positive relationship between lottery spending and education spending. Anderson
(1994) finds that after reform in Nebraska, school districts with higher tax rates receive
larger increases in state aid and school districts with higher spending receive smaller
increases in state aid, results that are consistent with the goals of centralization. Zimmer
and Jones (2005) find that after reform in Michigan, school districts with higher spending
issue more bonds as a way to maintain higher spending, a result that is inconsistent with
the goals of centralization; Maher and Skidmore (2008) support this finding with data
from Wisconsin. Despite the vast school finance literature, little attention is given to the
effect of TIF on school districts.
School districts first entered the TIF literature to determine the extent that
overlapping jurisdictions subsidize TIF (Huddleston 1981, 1984). Huddleston (1981)
defines the effective subsidy rate to measure the incidence of the subsidy by calculating
the portion of the tax increment paid by taxpayers residing outside the city that has TIF
but within the overlapping jurisdiction. Huddleston (1984) finds that cities with higher
population growth rates have higher effective subsidy rates. This relationship peaked
interest in the relationship between TIF and city population growth.
Anderson (1990) finds evidence supporting the relationship between TIF use and
property value growth, but cautions against concluding that TIF causes growth. He
suggests that TIF authorities may be capturing growth that would have occurred
otherwise. Man and Rosentraub‟s (1998) finding supports the positive relationship
between TIF adoption and property value growth but Dye and Merriman (2000) find
evidence of a negative relationship. These conflicting results indicate that the effects of
TIF may be different for different areas within the city, or across cities.
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Researchers separate the total effect of TIF on property value into two effects, one
on property value in the TIF district and one on property value in the rest of the city. Dye
and Merriman (2000) suggest that the cost of higher growth in the TIF district is lower
growth elsewhere in the city. Skidmore, Merriman, and Kashian (2009) confirm this,
finding that TIF decreases growth in non-TIF property value of the city but increases
growth in total property value of the city. They also find that within TIF districts,
commercial and manufacturing property value increases but residential property value is
not affected.
It can be asserted that different types of TIF districts produce different spillover
effects. Weber, Bhatta, and Merriman (2007) find evidence of negative spillovers from
commercial or industrial TIF districts and positive spillovers from mixed-use TIF
districts that contain both commercial and residential property. These spillover effects
have important implications for school finance. Since non-TIF property value is not
frozen, increases or decreases due to spillovers from TIF increase or decrease the school
district‟s tax base.
Theoretical Papers
The effect of TIF on overlapping jurisdictions and surrounding areas is modeled
in several theoretical papers. Lawrence and Stephenson (1995) model the incidence of
the tax increment on overlapping jurisdictions. They look at one city with TIF and find
that during the early years of TIF, taxpayers in the metro area subsidize TIF but in the
later years they benefit from lower tax rates and pay less property tax. Dye and
Sundberg (1998) model the net present value of tax revenue for the city and school
district to describe the efficiency, viability, and equity of TIF. They show that it is
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possible for TIF to be viable but not efficient and caution policymakers against using TIF
in these situations.
Brueckner (2001) models the effects of TIF on the city‟s provision of public
goods. He shows that when a public good is underprovided, TIF is not likely to be viable
and when TIF is viable, it may yield an inefficient amount of public good. Fernandez
(2004) extends Brueckner‟s (2001) model to include the school district‟s provision of
public goods. He finds that the school district may also produce an inefficient amount of
education as a result of TIF by either under- or over-providing its public good.
Skidmore, Merriman, and Kashian (2009) model spillovers and TIF viability. Each of
these models incorporates school districts to some extent in their analysis, but
individually they do not illustrate the effect of TIF of school finance.
Only one theoretical model explicitly looks at the effect of TIF on school finance.
Byrne (2005) models the net effect of a change in utility for residents resulting from
TIF‟s effect on expenditures per pupil for both the city and school district. The net effect
of TIF on expenditures per pupil equals the loss in revenue per pupil the city would have
received in the absence of TIF. This simple model assumes no change in the growth rate
of property value in the TIF district after TIF adoption and no revenue source other than
from property value. Byrne‟s (2005) model sheds light on TIF‟s effect on school finance,
but leaves many questions still unanswered.
Empirical Papers on TIF and School Finance
The area of school finance that has been discussed the most in empirical research
is TIF‟s relationship to state aid. Some researchers control for whether or not the
overlapping school district is in or out of formula. Neither Anderson (1990) nor Dye and
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Merriman (2000) find evidence that this affects the TIF adoption decision. Some
consider how state aid to school districts is affected by TIF. Huddleston (1981) says that
if the state aid formula includes the capture when calculating state aid, it ignores the fact
that the school district does not receive that portion of the tax increment. Hence, the
school district receives less state aid.
Lehnen and Johnson (2001) use data from several Midwestern states to look at
TIFs effect on school districts. Their data is descriptive and limited to a few variables.
First, they calculate the percent of school districts that have TIF for Indiana, Iowa,
Minnesota, and Wisconsin. The percentages range from 23 in Indiana to 99 in
Wisconsin. Then, they explain how state aid has changed in response to TIF over the
years. Michigan and Wisconsin increased state aid to offset the „loss‟ in local revenue.
In the past, Minnesota has penalized school districts with more TIF by decreasing state
aid because TIF makes less revenue available to the state. In addition, prior to 1988, “all
levies in Minnesota were not equalized, and TIF had created a need for higher local tax
rates” (p 142). Using data from Illinois, they calculate the variable „TIF as a percent of
total assessed valuation‟, which ranges from zero to 32 percent. They conclude that local
taxpayers subsidize TIF through higher tax rates in 67 school districts and all taxpayers
subsidize TIF through higher income and sales taxes. Other important factors affect the
school district‟s tax rate that Lehnen and Johnson (2001) do not control for when drawing
this conclusion.
Weber (2003) controls for other factors when examining TIF‟s effect on local and
state funding. Using school districts in Cook County, Illinois from 1989 to 1999, she
finds that school districts with more TIF intensity have smaller growth in revenue from
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property taxes but larger growth in state aid, suggesting that the state increases funding to
compensate for less local revenue. She also finds a negative relationship between TIF
and the school district‟s tax rate. This counterintuitive result could mean that state aid
more than offsets the decrease in local revenue or it could be due to changes in property
tax limitation legislation passed during the time period. Weber (2003) concludes by
questioning the state‟s willingness to compensate school district‟s with higher TIF
intensity with more state aid.
A similar study looks at the effect of TIF intensity on school district tax rates and
property values for school districts in the entire state. Weber, Hendrick, and Thompson
(2008) use data in Illinois to determine the effect of TIF on school district tax rates in
2001 and the change in property tax revenues between 1990 and 2000. The impact of
having at least one TIF district on changes in property tax revenue is positive in rural
school districts and negative for school districts in MSAs outside of the five-county
metro area. There is no impact in Cook county, the five-county metro area, or for the
overall sample. More TIF intensity leads to a larger increase in property tax revenue in
the five-county metro area and in other MSAs in the state. They find a small positive
effect of TIF on tax rates, with the largest effect in rural school districts. Although their
research is important in advancing the field, neither Weber (2003) nor Weber, Hendrick,
and Thompson (2008) use a theoretical model to motivate their empirical work.
Measures of TIF Used in the Literature
A quantitative measure of TIF is necessary to conduct empirical analysis. In the
past, most researchers use a dummy variable. They use „1‟ if the city has at least one TIF
district and „0‟ if none (Man and Rosentraub 1998, Dye and Merriman 2000). This
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measure is limited because it treats all TIF districts the same despite differences in age,
type, and capture. One measure used to reflect age is a dummy variable for the number
of years since TIF was adopted (Dye and Merriman 2000, Weber 2003). This is useful
when the observation contains only one TIF district, but cannot be used with multiple TIF
districts. Even though these measures are limited, they may have been the only measure
available at the time.
As better data have become available, researchers have used measures of the
magnitude of TIF. The most common measure is TIF intensity, which is defined as the
capture from TIF as a portion of the total assessed valuation in the school district (Lehnen
and Johnson 2001, Weber 2003, and Weber, Hendrick, and Thompson 2008). This
variable provides a more accurate description of the magnitude of TIF relative to an
overlapping jurisdiction, such as the municipality or school district. This is a good
measure because it should be positively correlated with the number of TIF districts, the
age of the TIF districts, and the magnitude of the TIF projects. It allows the unit of
observation to include several TIF districts. This is useful when studying the effect of
TIF on school finance because a school district may contain several TIF districts.
Gap in the Literature
Each of these papers contributes to our understanding of TIF. However, because
most of the articles do not focus on school districts, it is difficult to determine the effect
of TIF on school finance. The few papers that do focus on school finance represent a
small body of literature that needs to be expanded. Unfortunately, the theoretical models
thus far have not been empirically tested and the empirical papers are not based on a
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theoretical model. This paper fills this gap by developing a theoretical model that is
empirically tested.
The remainder of this paper includes the theoretical model, empirical analysis,
and policy implications. In Chapter 4 I develop a theoretical model of TIFs effect on
school finance through spillover effects on non-TIF property value growth rates. In
Chapter 5 I empirically test the hypotheses of the theoretical model on data from
Minnesota, a state that has a long history of TIF and where rich data are available at the
school district level. Policy implications and conclusions are drawn in the conclusion of
Chapter 6.
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Chapter 4
Theoretical Models
This chapter includes two theoretical models. The first is an illustration of how
TIF affects property within the TIF district and in the school district property. This
simple model ignores spillover effects, focusing only on property value over time within
the TIF district. It shows the short-run and long-run effects of TIF on the school district.
The second model begins with the choice of public goods from a budget constraint and
community preferences. Then the school district‟s budget constraint is used to explore
spillover effects of TIF on non-TIF property value growth. The second model is used to
develop hypotheses that are tested in Chapter 5.
A Model of Property Value over Time
This model illustrates the impact of TIF on school district tax revenue for three
different scenarios of pre-TIF property value growth. Each scenario includes discussion
of whether or not the school district is expected to support the municipality‟s use of TIF.
In the model, I first describe the case where all property is either blighted or non-blighted
and all of the blighted property is eligible for and uses TIF. Then, I consider the case
where not all of the blighted property is eligible for TIF and of the blighted property that
is eligible, not all use TIF. In each case, I describe the short-run and long-run
implications of TIF on a school district‟s local tax revenue. Finally, I comment on some
of the assumptions about the growth rates in the model.
The model appeals to the work of Ladd and Stephenson (1995) and Dye and
Sundberg (1998). Dye and Sundberg (1998) define an equation that describes a school
district‟s local tax revenue collection from two towns, one of which is partially blighted.
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I expand upon this concept to by defining subcategories of blighted areas. I also appeal
to Lawrence and Stephenson‟s (1995) theoretical model which decomposes the tax
increment into four components, one of which is the tax revenue that would have
occurred in the absence of TIF. This component is used to determine if the school district
subsidizes the TIF district and if so, by how much. If the school district subsidizes the
TIF district then there are negative consequences for school finance while the TIF district
is active. Ladd and Stephenson (1995) also include a time dimension to determine how
the shares of the four components change over time, which I consider when developing
the short-run and long-run aspects of my model.
All Blighted Property is Eligible for TIF and Uses TIF
Consider a school district with two types of property, blighted and non-blighted,
and assume that all of the blighted property is eligible for TIF and uses TIF. Before the
TIF district expires, property in the TIF district will no longer be blighted. As a result, all
of the property within the school district will be non-blighted, as illustrated in Figure 4.1.
When the TIF district expires, the property generates more tax revenue for the school
district than it would have without TIF.
Figure 4.1: Flow of Property within the School District
Property in the School District
Blighted ( )

Current TIF
District ( )

Non-blighted (V)

Expired TIF
District
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Property value is a function of the initial property value at the time of TIF
adoption and the growth rate. I will assume that the growth rate of the blighted property
increases after TIF adoption and the growth rate of the non-blighted property remains the
same. Non-blighted property value in year is

, which is based on the

initial value, , and a constant growth rate, . Similarly, blighted property value in year
is

, which is based on the initial value, , and a constant growth rate, .

Prior to TIF adoption, tax revenue for the school district in year
school district‟s tax rate,

is the product of the

and property value within the school district, given by
for

,

(4.1)

where is the year of TIF adoption.
After the infrastructure improvement, property value in the TIF district increases
to

and grows at a higher rate of . In year , property value in the TIF district is
. The tax increment is generated from the difference between the current

property value,

and frozen property value,

. While TIF is active, the

property value available to the school district is the frozen property value,
. The school district‟s tax revenue in year is the difference between the tax
revenue collected on all of the property in the school district and the tax increment,
(4.2)
for
where

,

is the year the TIF district expires.
Once the TIF district expires, none of the property in the school district is

blighted. The property value in the expired TIF district is

. After the
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TIF district expires, the growth rate is

and the school district once again receives tax

revenue from all of the property in the school district,
, for

(4.3)

This model has described the school district‟s tax revenue prior to TIF, while the
TIF is active, and after the TIF district expires. The next step is to determine when the
school district benefits from TIF. This occurs when net benefits for the school district
become positive. Benefits are defined as increased tax revenue or the absence of a loss in
tax revenue. Costs are defined as lost tax revenue. These calculations are made in both
the short-run and long-run, where the time period while the TIF district is active is
referred to as the short-run and the time period after the TIF district expires is referred to
as the long-run. In the short-run the school district can incur either costs or benefits,
depending on the growth rate of the property prior to TIF, but in the long-run the school
district strictly benefits.
The long-run benefits include the total tax revenue generated after the TIF district
expires from the formerly blighted property beyond what it would have been without TIF.
Calculating the short-run impact is more complicated because it involves the
counterfactual growth rate. If the blighted property value was increasing prior to TIF,
then a portion of the tax increment is not entirely due to the infrastructure improvement,
and the school district loses this tax revenue. Alternatively, if the blighted property
value was not increasing prior to TIF, then all of the tax increment is due to TIF. The
short-run cost or benefit depends on , the growth rate prior to TIF. Three possible
outcomes from the three different growth rates are illustrated and described below.
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Figure 4.2 illustrates the short-run and long-run effects of TIF on property values
within the TIF district if the pre-TIF growth rate is zero. The frozen property value is
and the initial increase in the property value due to TIF-financed infrastructure
improvements is

. In this case the entire tax increment is due to TIF. Although

the school district relinquishes the increment to the TIF authority, it is not actually losing
any tax revenue because the property value would not have increased without TIF. Area
A represents the total property value that the municipality collects the tax increment on.
In this case, the school district neither benefits nor loses from the presence of TIF in the
short-run. In the long-run, the school district benefits by receiving more tax revenue
from the higher property values as seen by the shaded area B, which occurs after the TIF
district expires. The school district loses nothing in the short-run and gains B in the longrun, resulting in a net gain.
Figure 4.2 Pre-TIF Growth Rate is Zero
Property Value in
TIF District

B
A

Time
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Equation 4.4 describes net benefits illustrated in Figure 4.2, which equals the tax
revenue generated from applying the school district‟s tax rate to the property value in the
TIF district each year after the TIF district expires,
.

(4.4)

Net benefits are positive starting when the TIF district expires. When property values are
constant prior to TIF adoption, the school district should be indifferent to TIF in the
short-run and support it in the long-run.
If the growth rate prior to TIF is positive, part of the increased property value
would have been available to the school district but with TIF it is captured by the
municipality. This property value is the shaded portion of Figure 4.3 between and
labeled C.
Figure 4.3 Pre-TIF Growth Rate is Positive
Property Value in
TIF District

B
A
C

D

Time

Area A represents neither a gain nor a loss to the school district because that property
value would never have increased without TIF. In the long-run, the school district is able
to tax property value D, which it also would have in the absence of TIF, so it is neither a
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loss nor a gain to the school district. The school district benefits from the increase in
property due to TIF after the TIF district expires, which is area B. Overall, this is the
worst case for the school district because it implies that the school district is subsidizing
the tax increment.
In this case, the school district incurs a loss in the short-run but benefits in the
long-run. Net benefits are,
,
(4.5)
where the first summation represents the long-run benefits, which is equal to the tax
revenue generated by applying the school district‟s tax rate to area B in Figure 4.3. The
second summation represents the short-run costs, which is equal to the tax revenue
generated by applying the school district‟s tax rate to area C in Figure 4.3. A discount
rate, , is included to reflect the opportunity cost of the school district not being able to
use these funds while the TIF district is active. When property value in the TIF district
increases prior to TIF adoption, we expect the school district to oppose the TIF district if
it only considers the short-run but support TIF if it considers the long-run.
The last scenario is when the property value in the blighted area is decreasing
prior to TIF. In this case, the property value in the absence of TIF would actually be less
than the frozen value. The school district benefits in the short-run from having TIF
because it does not lose tax revenue that it otherwise would have, as seen by the shaded
area C in Figure 4.4 between and

.
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Figure 4.4 Pre-TIF Growth Rate is Negative
Property Value in
TIF District

B
A
C

D

Time
Area A represents neither a gain nor a loss to the school district. In the long-run, the
school district benefits by receiving more tax revenue from the higher property value as
seen by the shaded areas B and D after time

. Area D represents the decrease in

property value that would have occurred in the absence of TIF. With TIF, the frozen
property value available to the school district is higher than this.
In this case, the school district benefits in the short-run and long-run. Net benefits
for the school district are,
.
(4.6)
The first summation reflects the long-run benefit, which is tax revenue generated from
the area B in Figure 4.4 and twice the value of area D. Tax revenue from area D is
included twice because without TIF, tax revenue from this property would have
decreased but with TIF, not only is tax revenue gained but tax revenue is not lost. The
second summation reflects the short-run benefit of the school district generated by
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applying the tax rate to area C in Figure 4.4. This is the tax revenue that the school
district would have lost in the absence of TIF, but with TIF it does not. As a result, the
school district does not lose tax revenue in the short-run. In the long-run, the school
district not only does not lose revenue, but it actually gains revenue. This is the best case
for the school district.
For each of the scenarios outlined above, the year that net benefits becomes
positive is the year when the school district begins to benefit from the municipality‟s use
of TIF. This depends on the growth rates in the TIF district, the discount rate, and the
duration of the TIF district. According to this model, school districts should always
support the municipality‟s decision to use TIF when growth rate in the TIF district prior
to TIF adoption is negative or zero. This results in no cost to the school district in terms
of lost local property tax revenue. Also, as seen in Figure 4.4 and Equation 4.6, it may
actually generate more revenue in the short-run than it would in the absence of TIF. The
only time a school district should oppose TIF is when the growth rate of property in the
TIF district is positive. However, because TIF is specifically designed for use in blighted
areas, it is unlikely to be adopted when the growth rate is positive. Therefore, school
districts are likely to support TIF in both the short-run and the long-run.
Not All Blighted Property is Eligible for TIF and Not All of the Blighted Property
that is Eligible for TIF Use It
This section extends the model by designating additional categories of property.
First, not all blighted property is eligible for TIF and there may be blighted property that
is eligible for TIF but the municipality chooses not to use TIF. Figure 4.5 builds upon
Figure 4.1, illustrating the classification of property values according to blight and TIF
usage.

42
Figure 4.5: Expanded Flow of Property within the School District
Property in the School District
Blighted

Not Eligible
for TIF

Non-blighted

Eligible
for TIF
Eligible
for TIF but not
using it

Expired TIF
District

Not Eligible
for TIF

Eligible
for TIF and
using it

Current TIF
District
Prior to TIF, tax revenue is generated according to Equation 4.7 by applying the school
district‟s tax rate to all property in the school district.
for

.

(4.7)

While the TIF district is active, tax revenue is generated according to Equation 4.8, where
the tax increment is subtracted from the total tax revenue,

for

(4.8)

When the TIF district expires, the school district collects tax revenue generated for the
property value within the TIF district,
for

.
(4.9)

It is apparent from the preceding equations that in the long-run and possibly also
in the short-run, it is in the school district‟s best interest to use TIF in all of the blighted
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property that is eligible for it. As the share of blighted property to total property
decreases, the school district has access to a higher tax base, increasing tax revenue.
Thus far, a few simplifying assumptions about growth rates have been made in the
model. First, all growth rates have been assumed constant, creating a linear trajectory of
property values in each classification. This assumption may be valid for property that
does not use TIF. However, it is possible that after infrastructure improvements are made
in the TIF district, the growth rate is non-linear, higher initially and then diminishing over
time. Also, growth rates are assumed the same across TIF districts and independent of
the magnitude of infrastructure improvement. It is possible that the post-TIF growth rate
depends on the magnitude and type of infrastructure improvement. With some additional
work, this model can be extended to relax the growth rate assumptions that are currently
imposed.
A Model of Property Value with TIF and Spillover Effects
The next theoretical model extends the current literature by showing the impact of
TIF on school finance through spillover effects. The first part of the model shows the
school district‟s expenditures per pupil derived from the school district‟s budget
constraint. The second part of the model shows how the non-TIF district property value
growth rate is affected by the TIF intensity in the school district.
A Summary of Previous Theoretical Models
There are only a few theoretical models of TIF and only one of them explicitly
includes TIF‟s effect on school finance. Brueckner (2001) models public good provision
in a city. Fernandez (2004) extends Brueckner‟s (2001) model to include public good
provision in a school district. Skidmore, Merriman, and Kashian (2009) extend
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Brueckner‟s (2001) model to include spillover effects within a city. Byrne (2005) models
TIF‟s effect on expenditures per pupil but the simplicity of the model does not fully
explain the relationship. Each of these models is described in more detail below.
Brueckner‟s (2001) theoretical model determines TIF‟s viability and, once
adopted, if the public good is likely to be over-, under-, or optimally provided. He solves
the city‟s budget constraint for its tax rate and differentiates with respect to a change in
public good due to TIF and finds that if the public good is „seriously underprovided‟ and
TIF is used, then the city‟s tax rate will decrease because the increase in property values
will otherwise create a budget surplus. However, if the public good is „moderately
underprovided‟ or „overprovided‟, the city‟s tax rate must increase to cover the increased
cost of providing the public good; this happens because the marginal benefit is either
slightly greater than or less than the marginal cost (p 300). Brueckner (2001) also looks
at the effect of the school district‟s tax rate on “TIF‟s range of relevance,” finding that an
increase in the school district‟s tax rate widens the range of relevance because “the public
improvement leads to a larger increase in combined city and school revenue under TIF”
(p 339). Although important in explaining TIF‟s effect on the city, Brueckner‟s (2001)
theoretical model does not explain the effects of TIF on the school district.
Fernandez (2004) extends Brueckner‟s (2001) model by including two
overlapping jurisdictions, a city and a school district. He uses an inter-temporal budget
constraint, allowing the city and school district to make decisions today based on future
cost and revenue streams, including when the TIF district expires. He looks at the effect
of TIF on school district behavior and finds that when the city‟s decision of public good
provision is exogenous of the school district‟s decision of public good provision, the
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school district underprovides its public good because less revenue is generated (p 160).
When the city‟s decision of public good provision is endogenous, the school district
over-, under-, or optimally provides its public good, depending on if the city under-, over, or optimally provides its public good respectively (p 162). This follows from the
assumption that the school district chooses its level of public good in order to maximize
property values. Although Fernandez‟s (2004) model includes school districts, the main
focus is on public good provision under TIF, not TIF‟s effect on school finance.
Skidmore, Merriman, and Kashian (2009) also extend Brueckner‟s (2001) model
to study the impact of TIF on property values in an entire city that contains a TIF district,
where property value in the neighborhood without TIF is affected by the level of public
goods in the neighborhood with TIF. They hypothesize that even though property value
within the TIF district increases, non-TIF district property value of the city decreases due
to negative spillovers. Using panel data from Wisconsin municipalities, Skidmore,
Merriman, and Kashian (2009) conduct an empirical analysis using Two-Stage Least
Squares. They find evidence supporting their hypothesis of negative spillovers from TIF.
The authors support this conclusion by stating that development would likely have
occurred in other areas of the city had TIF not been used (p 22). Although their unit of
observation is the city, the model can be extended to the school district to illustrate the
spillover effects within a school district. One drawback to their study is their
measurement of TIF, which is the number of TIF districts created over a certain time
period.
One model that looks explicitly at the relationship between TIF and expenditures
per pupil is that of Byrne (2005). Because his model of this relationship is not the
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primary model developed in the paper, it is included in the appendix. The partial
derivative of a school district budget constraint shows that an increase in TIF ultimately
decreases expenditures per pupil by the amount of tax revenue that the school district
would have received from that property value increase. However, this ignores the “but
for” clause, which assumes that the school district would not have the tax revenue
without TIF. He also uses growth rates in his model which assumes that growth prior to
TIF is the same as growth after TIF. This seems unlikely given that TIF is adopted in
blighted areas and spurs growth, implying lower growth prior to adoption. Although this
model shows TIF‟s effect on school finance, its simplicity does not fully illustrate the
relationship between TIF and school finance.
Although each of the aforementioned models incorporates aspects of TIF and/or
school finance, none adequately models both to determine the impact of TIF on school
finance. The theoretical model developed in this paper shows the effect of TIF on
expenditures per pupil via spillovers. It includes the school district‟s budget constraint
introduced by Brueckner (2001), including local, state, and federal revenue. It
incorporates the spillover effects of Skidmore, Merriman, and Kashian (2009), extending
the effects to the entire school district. This model differs from Byrne (2005) because it
does not consider the tax revenue from the tax increment as a necessary loss to the school
district.
School District Expenditures per Pupil without TIF
Every community must decide how much of each public good to provide. This
can be determined by comparing preferences of the taxpayers with a budget constraint.
Suppose there are two public goods, education (s) and a composite public good including
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all other public goods (x). The budget constraint includes all tax revenue and the prices
of each good. Figure 4.6 illustrates this scenario. The line

represents an initial

budget constraint. The preferences of the community are reflected by indifference curve
labeled

. In this case, the optimal choice of public goods is

and

.

Figure 4.6
The Choice of Educational Spending
Composite
Public Good (x)

Education (s)
An increase in the budget constraint allows the community to choose more of ,
, or both. This would happen if the price of the composite public good decreases, the
price of education decreases, or if more tax revenue is collected. For the purposes of this
paper, I will focus on a parallel shift of the budget constraint resulting from additional tax
revenue. This is illustrated in Figure 4.6 by budget constraint

. With the parallel

shift of the budget constraint, it is possible have more of both the composite public good
and education,

and

. It is also possible to have more of the composite public good

and the same amount of education and vice versa. Ultimately, the choice depends of the
preferences of the community, illustrated by indifference curves.
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An increase in the school district‟s revenue would result in a similar shift as
described above. However, because school district revenue is restricted for use solely on
education, the new budget line would be kinked, extending back to the y-axis at the
previous budget line. This could still yield the same increase in both the composite
public good and education to

and

as before or lead to a choice near the kink. The

choice would depend on the preferences of the community for these two goods. The
theoretical model developed in this chapter uses the school district‟s budget constraint to
illustrate how this shift can occur.
The school district‟s budget constraint is an identity that reflects the equality of a
school district‟s total revenue and total expenditure. Brueckner (2001) presents the
school district‟s budget constraint where total expenditure equals total revenue raised
from applying a tax rate to school district property value. His equation does not include
state or federal revenue. I extend his equation to reflect all revenue sources for the school
district. The school district‟s budget constraint is
,
where total expenditures,
and federal sources,

(4.10)
, equals revenue from local sources

, state sources,

,

.

Local revenue is determined by applying a local tax rate, , to all property in the
school district,
.

(4.11)

49
In some states, state funding is also a function of local property value. The subsequent
analysis is based on foundation aid, 7 which “provides aid based on the foundational level
of expenditures chosen by policymakers at the higher level of government” (Anderson
2003, p 556). Foundation aid is
expenditures and

, where

is the foundational level of total

is the foundation aid tax rate that is applied to local property values. 8

State aid equals the foundation level minus the tax revenue that the school district could
raise locally if it applied the foundation aid tax rate to its property value. Policymakers
define the values of

and

, which are the same for every school district. If

exceeds the foundation level of total expenditures, then the school district is out of
formula and the state does not provide foundation aid to that school district. Total state
revenue includes state aid and other revenue from grants, special education, and other
state sources, denoted by

,
.

Federal revenue,

(4.12)

is for child nutrition and other categorical reasons. Increases in

federal funds for education, such as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009, would result in an increase in the school district‟s total revenue and withdraw of
these funds would decrease to school district revenue. In either case, revenue derived
from property value will not be affected unless these funds are a function of local
property value.
Including local, state, and federal revenue, the school district‟s budget constraint
can be written in terms of property value,
7

I chose foundation aid because my empirical analysis uses data from Minnesota, which uses foundation
aid.
8
This formula is taken from Anderson (2003). The notation is changed to be consistent with the notation
of this model.
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.

(4.13)

Equation (4.13) shows that expenditures equal the tax revenue generated from property
value, state aid, other state revenue, and federal revenue. Dividing both sides by the
number of pupils, this equation can be written as expenditures per pupil and revenue per
pupil,
(4.14)
Because expenditures per pupil is a common measure of school finance, it will be used
in the remainder of the model.
School District Expenditures per Pupil with TIF
For school districts that have one or more TIF districts, the school district does
not collect tax revenue from the total property value of the TIF districts. Instead, it
collects tax revenue only from the frozen, pre-TIF property value. To illustrate this,
suppose there are two neighborhoods,

and , within a school district. Neighborhood

includes all TIF district property within the school district and neighborhood

includes

all non-TIF district property within the school district. In neighborhood , property value
increases over the frozen value; this increase is the capture. The school district does not
collect revenue from the capture, only from the frozen property value,

. Therefore,

with TIF, expenditures per pupil is,
,
where

is the frozen property value from the TIF district and

TIF district property value.

(4.15)
is the remaining non-
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School District Expenditures per Pupil with TIF Spillovers
Now suppose that TIF creates externalities in neighborhood , as suggested by
Skidmore, Merriman, and Kashian (2009). Then, property value in neighborhood
function of TIF used in neighborhood , where
in neighborhood

is a

denotes the property value increase

due to TIF,
.

(4.16)

Making this substitution, the school district‟s budget constraint is,
.
Differentiating expenditures per pupil (4.17) with respect to

(4.17)
provides the

effect of TIF on expenditures per pupil,
.

(4.18)

The sign of the first term depends on the relationship between the school district‟s tax
rate and the foundation aid tax rate. The sign of the second term depends on the spillover
effect,

.
If the school district‟s tax rate exceeds the foundation aid tax rate, as it often does,

the first term on the right is positive and the sign of the overall effect depends on the
spillover effect. If neighboring properties benefit from TIF,

, then

expenditures per pupil increase due to increases in property values that are not excluded
from school district taxation. The magnitude of the increase equals the increase in
property value multiplied by the difference between the school district tax rate and the
foundation aid tax rate, weighted by the number of pupils. Some of the revenue
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generated from the increase in property values in local revenue is offset by a decrease in
state aid.
If the school district‟s tax rate exceeds the foundation aid tax rate and neighboring
property values suffer from TIF,

, then expenditures per pupil decrease. In

this case, part of the decrease is offset by an increase in state aid.
If there are no spillovers, then

, and TIF has no effect on expenditures

per pupil because the property tax base is not affected. If the school district‟s tax rate
equals the foundation aid tax rate, any change in local property tax revenue is equally
offset by a change in state aid. If the school district‟s tax rate is lower than the
foundation aid tax rate, then the first term is negative. Although this is possible, it is not
likely. Most school districts raise more revenue than what the state deems adequate.
However, if a school district has a high enough tax base, it may be sufficient to impose a
tax rate lower than the foundation aid tax rate. In this case, if there are positive
spillovers, the effect of TIF on expenditures per pupil is negative because the decrease in
state aid exceeds the increase in revenue raised at the local level. Alternately, negative
spillovers increase expenditures per pupil and no spillover results in no change in
expenditures per pupil.
Table 4.1 summarizes the effects of TIF on expenditures per pupil under positive
spillovers, negative spillovers, and no spillovers and on the relationship between the
school district‟s tax rate and the state aid foundation aid tax rate.
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Table 4.1
The Effects of TIF on School Finance in the Presence of Spillovers

Positive Spillover
Negative Spillover
No Spillover

>0
<0
0

<0
>0
0

0
0
0

In summary, under the likely scenario that the school district‟s tax rate exceeds
the foundation rate, we have the following results. With positive spillovers, an increase
in TIF increases expenditures per pupil, ceteris paribus. This is the ideal outcome for the
school district because the school district can have higher expenditures per pupil, without
an increase in the tax rate. With negative spillovers, an increase in TIF decreases
expenditures per pupil, ceteris paribus. This is the worst outcome for the school district
because they will have to decrease expenditures per pupil. If an increase in TIF has no
spillovers, expenditures per pupil is not affected.
School District Expenditures per Pupil with TIF Intensity
The nature of the spillover effect depends on TIF intensity, which is the capture as
a percent of the total property value within the school district,

. First, non-

TIF district property value is written as a function of TIF intensity. The equation is
assumed to be quadratic to account for a non-linear effect. This will provide a way to test
if the nature of the spillover effect changes with respect to TIF intensity. The growth rate
of the non-TIF district property value is given by the following equation,
,

(4.19)
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where

represents a normally distributed error term.

Taking the derivative of the growth rate with respect to TIF intensity yields,
.

(4.20)

Setting this equation equal to zero indicates the level of TIF intensity that maximizes
property value growth. That value is
.

(4.21)

TIF intensity can then be incorporated into the school district‟s budget constraint to
determine its effect on expenditure per pupil. Solving the growth rate (4.19) for the nonTIF district property value yields,
,

(4.19)

Substituting this into the school district‟s budget constraint (4.15),

where
yields,

.
(4.20)
Differentiating with respect to TIF intensity yields,
.

(4.21)

If the school district tax rate exceeds the foundation aid tax rate, then
. Property values and pupils are both positive. Therefore, the sign depends on the
parameters

and

. If

, then higher TIF intensity leads to higher

expenditures per pupil. If

, then higher TIF intensity leads to lower

expenditures per pupil. As before, setting this equation equal to zero provides the TIF
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intensity that maximizes the impact of TIF intensity on expenditures per pupil. As
before, this occurs when,

.

Testable Hypotheses
This model includes two parameters,

and

. If

, then there are positive

spillovers from TIF on non-TIF district property value. If

, then there are negative

spillovers. If the effect of TIF on non-TIF district property value growth is linear,
be zero. However, if there is a non-linear effect,
and

, then the sign of

will

will be non-zero. In addition, if

indicates whether spillovers increase or decrease

over time. It is also possible that there is no spillover effect. In that case, both
will be zero. While the theoretical model is perfectly general, permitting the possibility
of (1) no spillovers, (2) positive spillovers, or (3) negative spillovers, depending on the
parameters as indicated above, it remains for the empirical evidence to provide support
for these testable hypotheses.
Although Skidmore, Merriman, and Kashian (2009) find evidence of negative
spillovers, they do not allow for a non-linear effect. I hypothesize that there may be
positive spillovers with low levels of TIF intensity but negative spillovers with high
levels of TIF intensity. TIF may be used sparingly or for small projects in areas of blight
that would otherwise deter neighboring development. In these cases, TIF could be the
impetus that attracts development and spurs property value growth in neighboring, nonTIF district property. Although TIF may initially stimulate non-TIF property value
growth, after a certain point the spillover effect may be negative. If TIF is used
excessively, it may attract development that would have occurred elsewhere in the school
district in the absence of TIF. If businesses think they are likely to get approval for TIF,
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they may wait on non-TIF developments. If these hypotheses are true, then estimations
of the values of

and

should be positive and negative respectively.

The TIF intensity that maximizes non-TIF district property growth is
from equation (4.21). If evidence supports this relationship, estimates of

and

can

be used to estimate this TIF intensity. In addition, we can determine what levels of TIF
intensity actually lead to a decline in non-TIF district property growth. Figure 4.7
illustrates this.
Figure 4.7
Non-TIF District Property Value Growth Rate
Non-TIF District
Property Value
Growth Rate

TIF Intensity

As seen in equation (4.21), the same TIF intensity that maximizes non-TIF district
property growth also maximizes expenditures per pupil. Figure 4.8 illustrates this.
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Figure 4.8
Expenditures per Pupil
Expenditures per
Pupil

TIF Intensity

The theoretical model developed in this chapter shows the effect of TIF on school
finance through expenditures per pupil. It fills the gap in the literature by focusing solely
on the school district‟s perspective. Unlike related previous studies, it incorporates
property value spillovers resulting from TIF. As state and local governments experience
increasing financial pressures, local economic development incentives such as TIF may
become more popular among local governments. It is important to study this issue and
learn how it impacts education.
This model can be extended to account for changes in state aid. For example, if
the foundation aid tax rate increases, foundation aid will decrease with positive spillovers
and increase with negative spillovers. As states feel pressure to provide more equity
across school districts, they may take on more of the financial responsibility for primary
and secondary education. If states shift the tax burden from the local level to the state
level, they will decrease their reliance on local revenue for education finance. In this
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case, the effect of TIF on school finance will decrease. The next chapter uses data from
Minnesota to empirically test the hypotheses from this model.
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Chapter 5
Evidence from Minnesota
In this chapter, I empirically test hypotheses derived from the theoretical model
developed in Chapter 4. I use data from Minnesota to determine the nature of the
spillover effect of TIF on school finance. I also compare the results of the empirical
estimation with the averages of the school districts to determine the spillover effects they
have been experiencing in the 1990s and 2000s.
TIF in Minnesota
The TIF Act was created in 1979 to govern "the creation and administration of
TIF districts” (Tax Increment Financing Legislative Report, 2005, p 4). Since 1979, TIF
legislation has changed frequently and become more cumbersome. As a result, the 1995
Omnibus Tax Act established the Tax Increment Financing Division of the Office of the
State Auditor (p 2), which enforces TIF legislation, collects data, and submits an annual
report on TIF to the Legislature (p 5). TIF districts report to the TIF Division annually.
In Minnesota TIF is used primarily to “promote economic development,
redevelopment, and housing in areas where it would not otherwise occur,” (Tax
Increment Financing Legislative Report, 2010, p 1). In 1996 there were 1,830 TIF
districts and by 2003 there were 2,184 (Tax Increment Financing Legislative Report,
2005, p 26). Since 2004, the number of TIF districts has steadily declined (Tax
Increment Financing Legislative Report, 2010, p 27). This was most likely spurred by
changes in property tax laws in 2001 reduced the amount of revenue available for tax
increments, decreasing the financial viability of new TIF districts. The average tax
increment revenue per district decreased by 32 percent from 2001 to 2002 from $150,253
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to $102,227 (Tax Increment Finance Legislative Report: 2005, p 26). As a result, the
number of new TIF districts declined dramatically from nearly 150 in 2001 to less than
100 in 2002 and has been slowly declining since (Tax Increment Finance Legislative
Report: 2005, p 27).
School Finance in Minnesota
Prior to 2001, school districts received funding from a combination of property
taxes and state aid. Minnesota‟s foundation aid was „equalized‟, where the local levy was
calculated by “comparing a district‟s adjusted net tax capacity per pupil unit to the
equalizing factor” which was “determined by dividing the basic formula allowance by the
tax capacity rate” (Financing Education in Minnesota, 1997-1998, p 3). The state paid
the difference between the formula allowance and the local levy.
In 2001, the state began to fully fund the general education levy in an attempt to
reduce inequities that resulted from differences in local wealth across school districts.
The general education levy was completely replaced with state education aid beginning in
fiscal year 2003 (Minnesota School Finance History). School districts can still raise
revenue from property taxes for specific expenditures but this must be approved by voters
and is limited by state statute.
TIF and School Finance in Minnesota
The tax increment of a TIF district is the product of the original tax rate and the
captured tax capacity of the TIF district (Minnesota House of Representatives 2006). The
original local tax rate is the sum of the city, county, and school district tax rates in the
year the TIF district is created. This applies to districts created after 1988; districts
created prior to 1988 use the current local tax rate to determine the increment. Because
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the 2001 tax law change eliminated the general levy, education state aid is no longer a
function of local property values and therefore not affected by TIF.
Data
Data for the empirical analysis come from the Minnesota Department of Revenue,
the Department of Education, and the Office of the State Auditor. Data were provided
for each year from 1992 through 2007. Data for TIF districts are from the Office of the
State Auditor. These variables include the original net tax capacity, the current net tax
capacity, and the change in net tax capacity for every TIF district in the state. The
change in net tax capacity is the difference between the current and original net tax
capacities and represents the property value that the school district cannot tax. The
values for these variables are aggregated for all TIF districts within a school district to get
the totals for each school district. The change in net tax capacity will be used to generate
the TIF intensity of the school district and the current net tax capacity will be used to
generate the non-TIF district property value. Total Real and Personal Net Tax Capacity
for each school district was provided by the Department of Revenue. This is used to
calculate the TIF intensity for each school district.
In addition, I include data on three other variables to provide a context for the size
and location of the school districts. First, I include the average number of students in
each school district, provided by the Department of Education. Next, I identify the
school districts that are located in the Seven County Metropolitan Area. I use this to
control for differences between metro and non-metro school districts related to economic
development and property values. I also identify the school districts that are in the seven
Iron Range counties. Due to mining in these counties, the taconite production tax is, “a
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major source of revenue to the counties, municipalities and school districts with the
taconite assistance area,” (Mining Tax Guide, 2010, p 1). It is important to control for
this in empirical estimation because of its effect on school finance in the school districts
in these counties. Table 5.1 includes the description and source of each variable.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 5.2 shows the averages of the variables that are used in estimation. The
averages of these variables are also calculated separately for school districts with TIF and
for school districts without TIF, represented in Tables 5.3 and 5.4 respectively. From
1992 to 2007, the number of school districts declined by 21 percent from 421 to 334.
Most of the decline occurred in the early 1990s. During that time, the number of school
districts with TIF increased from 248 to 266. In 1992, only 59 percent of all school
districts had at least one TIF district. In 2007, that number increased to 80 percent.
As school districts consolidated over time, the average number of pupils per
school district increased from 1823 in 1992 to 2411 in 2007. The average number of
students in school districts with TIF was significantly higher than the average number of
students in school districts without TIF. For the school districts with TIF, the average
number of pupils fluctuated over the fifteen years, ranging from 2782 to 3136. School
districts without TIF had between 449 and 602 students on average. This number also
fluctuated over the fifteen years.
The next three variables in Table 5.3 represent information on TIF within the
school district. The average net tax capacity change for school districts with TIF
increased from $912,426 in 1992 to $1,118,733 in 2007. The increase was steady from
1992 to 2001 but in 2002, it declined dramatically.

Table 5.1
Variable Description and Sources
Variable

Description

a

Pupils

Total resident ADM of all district residents, pre-kindergarten through grade 12
b

Original Net Tax Capacity

The original net tax capacity of the TIF district. The original value is the base year value plus any
adjustments for applicable classification changes, class rate changes, growth adjustment for economic
development districts where applicable, etc.

Current Net Tax Capacityb

Total Real and Personal Net Tax Capacityc

The current net tax capacity of all payable taxable property located within the TIF district that is payable
in that year.
The net tax capacity change equals the current net tax capacity minus the original net tax capacity. The
net tax capacity change is set equal to zero when the calculated amount is negative.
The total fully taxable real and personal taxable market value within the school district.

TIF Intensity

Net Tax Capacity Change divided by the Total Real and Personal Net Tax Capacity

Non-TIF Property Value Growth Rate

The growth rate of the difference between The Total Real and Personal Net Tax Capacity and the Current
Net Tax Capacity.
A dummy variable indicating whether the school district is located in the Seven County Metro Area.
These include: Anoka, Carver, Dakota, Hennepin, Ramsey, Scott, and Washington counties.
A dummy variable indicating whether the school district is located in the Iron Range. These include:
Aitkin, Cook, Crow Wing, Itaska, Lake, and St. Louis counties.

Net Tax Capacity Changeb

Metrob
Iron Rangee

Source:
a. Minnesota Department of Education
b. Definitions from Minnesota Department of Revenue, Data from Minnesota Office of the State Auditor, Tax Increment Financing Division
c. Minnesota Department of Revenue, Property Tax Division
e. Minnesota Department of Revenue, Mining Tax Guide
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Table 5.2
Averages for All School Districts

Year
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992

n
334
337
338
337
337
338
339
340
341
343
349
356
376
390
408
421

Pupils
2411
2394
2397
2425
2444
2457
2463
2465
2467
2444
2390
2314
2162
2054
1923
1823

Original
Net Tax
Capacity
$134,957
$134,631
$129,195
$129,289
$127,204
$127,764
$207,080
$203,135
$202,595
$278,821
$304,399
$271,691
$235,839
$218,982
$217,766
$216,402

Current
Net Tax
Capacity
$1,025,241
$915,869
$854,899
$834,143
$789,389
$734,154
$1,065,518
$945,957
$894,552
$925,568
$980,637
$904,170
$812,642
$778,591
$792,376
$751,618

Net Tax
Capacity
Change
$890,967
$783,217
$726,975
$705,604
$662,835
$607,295
$860,638
$744,924
$693,288
$700,798
$709,501
$642,477
$582,353
$563,397
$577,318
$537,486

Total Real and
Personal Net
Tax Capacity
$17,456,217
$15,460,126
$13,754,876
$12,260,911
$11,103,575
$10,086,419
$12,555,785
$11,261,615
$10,523,626
$10,468,455
$10,678,978
$9,775,628
$8,735,437
$8,100,049
$7,822,255
$7,649,876

TIF
Intensity
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.02
0.02
0.02

Non-TIF
Property Value
Growth
na
0.13
0.13
0.13
0.11
0.09
-0.13
0.08
0.06
0.00
-0.02
0.06
0.07
0.05
-0.02
0.03

Metro
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.14
0.13
0.13
0.12
0.12
0.11

Iron
Range
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.06
0.06
0.07
0.06
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Table 5.3
Averages for All School Districts with TIF

Year
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992

n
266
267
270
268
268
268
267
264
263
258
249
247
247
242
244
248

Pupils
2909
2902
2882
2900
2932
2960
2985
3002
3045
3076
3136
3106
3033
3020
2909
2782

Original
Net Tax
Capacity
$169,458
$169,927
$161,733
$162,576
$159,955
$161,135
$262,921
$261,614
$262,680
$370,680
$426,648
$391,587
$359,010
$352,904
$364,133
$367,360

Current
Net Tax
Capacity
$1,287,332
$1,155,985
$1,070,207
$1,048,904
$992,627
$925,911
$1,352,849
$1,218,279
$1,159,857
$1,230,504
$1,374,468
$1,303,176
$1,237,058
$1,254,754
$1,324,957
$1,275,933

Net Tax
Capacity
Change
$1,118,733
$988,554
$910,065
$887,271
$833,490
$765,916
$1,092,721
$959,372
$898,901
$931,680
$994,441
$926,000
$886,497
$907,954
$965,351
$912,426

Total Real and
Personal Net
Tax Capacity
$21,174,644
$18,855,379
$16,659,596
$14,744,296
$13,381,494
$12,197,786
$15,303,863
$13,830,235
$13,170,196
$13,384,726
$14,273,464
$13,396,508
$12,539,432
$12,250,418
$12,197,222
$12,140,753

TIF
Intensity
0.02
0.02
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04

Non-TIF
Property Value
Growth
na
0.13
0.13
0.13
0.11
0.10
-0.13
0.09
0.06
0.00
-0.01
0.07
0.07
0.05
0.00
0.02

Metro
0.18
0.18
0.17
0.17
0.17
0.17
0.17
0.17
0.17
0.18
0.18
0.19
0.19
0.19
0.18
0.18

Iron
Range
0.07
0.07
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.09
0.07
0.07
0.07
0.06
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Table 5.4
Averages for All School Districts without TIF

Year
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992

n
68
70
68
69
69
70
72
76
78
85
100
109
129
148
164
173

Pupils
462
456
471
577
548
532
527
602
519
528
533
520
493
473
457
449

Original
Net Tax
Capacity
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0

Current
Net Tax
Capacity
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0

Net Tax
Capacity
Change
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0
$0

Total Real and
Personal Net
Tax Capacity
$2,910,609
$2,509,658
$2,221,429
$2,615,299
$2,256,005
$2,002,898
$2,364,997
$2,339,040
$1,599,934
$1,616,715
$1,728,709
$1,570,514
$1,451,819
$1,313,635
$1,313,157
$1,212,087

TIF
Intensity
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Non-TIF
Property Value
Growth
na
0.13
0.13
0.12
0.09
0.07
-0.13
0.05
0.05
-0.02
-0.03
0.05
0.06
0.04
-0.05
0.04

Metro
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.04
0.03
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02
0.02

Iron
Range
0.06
0.06
0.04
0.03
0.03
0.03
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.04
0.03
0.03
0.05
0.04
0.06
0.06
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Average original net tax capacity and average current net tax capacity also declined in
2002. This was most likely due to the “elimination of the local education levy subject to
capture by TIF authorities” and “the decertification of large, pre-1979 districts,” (Tax
Increment Finance Legislative Report 2005, p 26). After 2002, the net tax capacities
continued to increase once again.
As with the number of pupils, total real and personal net tax capacity is higher in
school districts with TIF than school districts without TIF. In 1992 total real and
personal net tax capacity in school districts without TIF was just over a million dollars,
just 10 percent of the 12 million dollar total real and personal net tax capacity in the
school districts with TIF. In 2007, total real and personal net tax capacity in school
districts without TIF was under three million dollars and over 21 million dollar in the
school districts with TIF.
!n 1992, TIF intensity for school districts with TIF was four percent. This means
that the TIF capture, as measured by the net tax capacity change, was four percent of the
total real and personal net tax capacity of the school district. This figure steadily declined
to half that value to two percent in 2007. Even though change in net tax capacity due to
TIF has increased over time, the increase in total tax capacity increased to a greater
extent.
During this time period, the non-TIF property value growth rate for all school
districts fluctuated from negative thirteen percent to positive 13 percent. The negative 13
percent growth rate between 2001 and 2002 was most likely due to changes in the tax law
in 2001 referred to above. Since then, non-TIF district growth has been higher than the

68
past years at slightly above ten percent. Similar figures are seen for the non-TIF property
value growth rates in school district with TIF as seen in Table 5.4.
The metro variable indicates if the school district is located in the Seven County
Metropolitan region. For this variable, the average represents the proportion. Since
1997, between 11 and 14 percent of all school districts are located in this region.
Between 17 and 19 percent of the school districts with TIF are located in the metro region
while only one to four percent of the school districts without TIF are located in the metro
region. This may explain why the school districts with TIF have a larger number of
pupils and higher total real and personal net tax capacity.
For all school districts, the proportion of school districts in the Iron Range is six
and six percent over the 15 years. For school districts with TIF, the proportion is
between seven percent and nine percent over the 15 years. For the school districts
without TIF, the proportion is six percent in 1992, decreases to three percent and then
increases to six percent in 2007.
Empirical Estimation
Using the data described above, I estimate two equations. First, I estimate
equation (4.19) from Chapter 4,

. Next, I estimate

the same equation with the inclusion of three additional variables, school districts in the
Seven County Metropolitan Area (

), school districts in the Iron Range (

,

and school districts that were consolidated between the two years of the growth rate
(

,
.

(5.1)
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The non-TIF property value growth rate (

) is calculated by taking the growth rate

of the difference in real and personal net tax capacity and the current net tax capacity of
the school district. The difference between the real and personal net tax capacity and the
current net tax capacity represents the non-TIF property value of the school district. TIF
intensity (

) is calculated by dividing the change in net tax capacity of the school

district by the real and personal net tax capacity of the entire school district. In other
words, this is the capture as a portion of the total property value in the school district.
The model is estimated by ordinary least squares using data from each of 15 time
periods. Because of possible heteroskedasticity, White‟s heteroskedasticity-consistent
covariance matrix estimator is used to obtain coefficient standard errors.
Results
Results for the model without the controls for
shown in Table 5.5 and 5.6. The coefficient estimates for

,

, and
and

are

are reported for

each time period from 1992-93 (listed as 1992) in Table 5.5 through 2006-07 (listed as
2006) in Table 5.6. The explanatory power of the regressions ranges from less than one
percent to almost ten percent as measured by the R 2. Seven of the 15 years have
statistically significant results, as measured by having both statistically significant
coefficients and passing the F-test of overall significance. Of the seven years with
significant results, five have both a positive coefficient for
for

and a negative coefficient

(1993, 1996, 2000, 2002, and 2003). These results support the hypothesis that

TIF intensity initially stimulates growth in non-TIF district property value but eventually
causes it to fall.

Table 5.5
Regression Results for TIF Intensity, 1992-1999
1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

INT

-.5854
(.1346)

***

.7193
(.1286)

***

.1832
(.1179)

-.0634
(.1705)

.3858
(.1005)

***

.0817
(.1233)

.2626
(.1601)

INT2

1.8857
(.7389)

**

-1.6907
(.5993)

***

-.5439
(.7641)

.5561
(.9642)

-1.1406
(.4869)

**

-.1808
(.8851)

-1.3756
(1.3920)

-1.6409
(.8884)

.0118
376

.0022
356

.0439
349

.0030
343

.0112
340

.0048
339

2.225

.386

7.934

.519

1.911

.814

R2
n

.0436
408

F-testa

9.235

.0982
390
***

21.081

***

***

*

.2899
(.2062)
*

* 10 percent level of significance
** 5 percent level of significance
*** 1 percent level of significance
a. Test of the joint hypothesis that all coefficients, except the intercept, equal zero.
Coefficient standard errors are shown in parentheses.
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Table 5.6
Regression Results for TIF Intensity, 2000-2006
2000

2001

INT

.8409
(.1408)

***

-.5090
(.1970)

INT2

-3.1791
(0.7362)

***

R2
n
F-testa

.0978
339
18.207

***

2002

2004

2005

2006

.4983
(.1693)

***

.5042
(.1805)

***

.1345
(.1470)

-.1172
(.1041)

-.2752
(.1253)

.2896
(.8645)

-2.2648
(1.0410)

**

-3.0893
(1.0630)

***

-.9893
(.7030)

-.2575
(.4736)

.3502
(.5653)

.0510
338

.0255
337

.0027
337

.0174
337

.0095
334

0.456

2.964

8.993

***

2003

***

4.364

.0214
337
**

3.644

**

*

**

1.596

* 10 percent level of significance
** 5 percent level of significance
*** 1 percent level of significance
a. Test of the joint hypothesis that all coefficients, except the intercept, equal zero.
Coefficient standard errors are shown in parentheses.
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However, six of the 15 years have statistically insignificant coefficient estimates for both
and

, one year supports a positive linear relationship, one year supports a negative

linear relationship.
The general patterns in the above results are supported by estimation of the model
while controlling for

,

, and

. Those results are reported in Tables

5.7 and 5.8. Including the control variables increases the explanatory power of the
regressions. The R2 ranges from less than one percent to almost 20 percent. A test of
joint significance for the control variables indicates that at least one of the control
variables is significant in all years except 1995, 1998, 2005, and 2006. Of the remaining
equations, five have a positive coefficient for

and a negative coefficient for

(1993, 1996, 2000, 2002, and 2003). These results also provide evidence of an initial
positive spillover effect followed by a negative spillover effect. For the remaining years,
the results remain mixed.
In order to determine the TIF intensity that maximizes the property value growth,
we can use the estimates of

and

to calculate

. Using the coefficient

estimates from Table 5.7, the optimal TIF intensity in 1993 was 21 percent.9 This means
that below 21 percent, more TIF intensity is associated with a higher non-TIF district
property value growth rate but above 21 percent, a higher TIF intensity is associated with
positive but lower non-TIF district property value growth rate. Using the coefficient
estimates from Tables 5.7 and 5.8, the optimal value was 15 percent in 1996, 10 percent
in 2000, eight percent in 2002, and six percent in 2003. According to the model, over

9

-.6012/(2*-1.4629) = .2055 = 20.55%
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this time period the optimal TIF intensity decreased, decreasing the length of the positive
spillover effect.
The actual average TIF intensity of the school districts for these years was well
below the estimated optimal values and has been decreasing over time. Average TIF
intensity was four percent in 1993 and 1996; and three percent in 2000, 2002 and 2003.
However, some school districts have had more than the optimal TIF intensity. The
highest TIF intensity for an individual school district was 35 percent in 1992. Intensity
decreased to 30 percent in 1997 and hovered around 25 percent from 1998 through 2007.
Those school districts may have been experiencing negative spillover effects from such
high TIF intensity, causing strain on their revenue generating capacity.
The above results provide evidence that school districts may or may not benefit
from TIF within the school district, depending on the amount of TIF intensity. Based on
the average TIF intensity, it appears that most school districts have benefited from
positive spillover effects on non-TIF district property value. Although these results are
supported by five of the fifteen years of data, the mixed results of the remaining ten years
indicate that additional research is necessary to confirm the conclusion of these results.

Table 5.7
Regression Results for TIF Intensity and Controls, 1992-1996
1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

INT

-.3010
(.1257)

**

.6012
(.1341)

***

.1505
(.1167)

-.1133
(.1643)

.2692
(.1045)

***

-.0067
(.1201)

.1754
(.1614)

.1323
(.1995)

INT2

1.3568
(.5808)
-.0480
(.0081)
-.0114
(.0111)
-.0012
(.0130)

**

-1.4629
(.6171)
.0184
(.0082)
.0698
(.0092)
-.0405
(.0186)

**

-.4782
(.7492)
.0063
(.0071)
.0231
(.0073)
.0044
(.0070)

.6525
(.9417)
.0088
(.0095)
.0010
(.0080)
-.0001
(.0233)

-.9118
(.4551)
.0213
(.0069)
-.0089
(.0081)
-.0121
(.0151)

**

-.0306
(.8223)
.0171
(.0065)
-.0092
(.0093)
-.0383
(.0107)

-1.3133
(1.4110)
.0157
(.0056)
.0064
(.0071)
-.0078
(.0120)

-1.5891
(.8715)
.0322
(.0060)
-.0048
(.0066)
-.0672
(.0468)

.0053
356

.0751
349

METRO
IRON
CONSOL

R2
n

***

.0923
408

**
***
**

.1969
390

***

.0339
376

***

***

***

.0385
343

.0243
340

.0283
339
1.936

F-testa

8.172

***

18.828

***

2.594

**

.371

5.567

***

2.701

**

1.665

b

11.879

***

20.484

***

3.556

**

.284

4.273

***

7.671

***

2.869

F-test

***

**

11.761

*
***

*
***

* 10 percent level of significance
** 5 percent level of significance
*** 1 percent level of significance
a. Test of the joint hypothesis that all coefficients, except the intercept, equal zero.
b. Test of joint hypothesis that the coefficients on METRO, IRON, and CONSOL equal zero
Coefficient standard errors are shown in parentheses.
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Table 5.8
Regression Results for TIF Intensity and Controls, 2000-2006
2000

2001

2002

2003

INT

.6045
(.1343)

***

-.0878
(.1926)

.3384
(.1766)

*

.3563
(.1820)

INT2

-3.0225
(.7369)
.0447
(.0061)
-.0131
(.0085)

***

-.2033
(.7725)
-.0664
(.0097)
-.0287
(.0128)

-2.2054
(1.0830)
.0291
(.0074)
.0097
(.0084)

**

-3.0318
(1.1070)
.0291
(.0081)
.0339
(.0091)

-.1849
(.0040)

***

METRO
IRON
CONSOLa

R2
n

***

.1996
339

-.0508
(.0054)

***
**

***

2004

2005

2006

*

.0333
(.1509)

-.1387
(.1124)

-.2744
(.1289)

***

-.9472
(.7349)
.0190
(.0067)
.0189
(.0096)

-.2382
(.4814)
.0035
(.0050)
.0028
(.0096)

.3498
(.5671)
-.0006
(.0060)
-.0058
(.0116)

***
***

***
**

***

.1396
338

-.0140
(.0052)
.0563
337

.0663
337

.0305
337

.0188
337

.0102
334

F-testb

16.613

***

10.772

***

4.956

***

5.897

***

2.610

**

1.590

.677

c

889.369

***

43.816

***

7.927

***

11.898

***

5.369

***

.269

3.890

F-test

**

***

***

* 10 percent level of significance
** 5 percent level of significance
*** 1 percent level of significance
a. There were no school district consolidations from 2001-02, 2002-03, 2003-04, and 2004-05.
b. Test of the joint hypothesis that all coefficients, except the intercept, equal zero.
c. Tests of joint hypothesis that the coefficients on METRO, IRON, and CONSOL equal zero.
Coefficient standard errors are shown in parentheses.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion

This paper finds some evidence in support of spillovers from TIF on non-TIF
property value growth within school districts but the overall finding is mixed. These
spillovers are positive with low levels of TIF intensity but negative with high levels of
TIF intensity. If a school district is experiencing positive spillovers, the school district
benefits from higher revenue. If a school district is experiencing negative spillovers, the
school district suffers from lower revenue. Evidence from Minnesota suggests that most
school districts are benefiting from TIF through positive spillovers. However, some
school districts have more than the optimal amount of TIF intensity. In these situations,
school districts would be better off with less TIF and should be cautious about proposals
for additional TIF districts.
The significant contributions of this paper are the use of school districts as units
of observations, the inclusion of non-linear spillovers, and the measure of TIF intensity
that uses property values. By focusing on school districts, I am able to begin to
understand how TIF affects school finance. Including non-linear effects allows for the
possibility of both positive and negative spillovers, depending on the magnitude of TIF
within the school district. Measuring TIF with property values provides a richer measure
of the size of TIF districts relative to all property value. This is a richer measure than a
simple count of TIF districts. All of these contributions jointly shed light on the answers
to the questions originally posed in the Introduction. First, it appears that TIF does affect
non-TIF district property value within the school district in some cases. The non-linear
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effect is initially positive for low proportions of TIF but negative for high levels of TIF.
However, more research should be undertaken to support this conclusion. As for the
second question, this paper only answers that theoretically. Theoretically, TIF does
affect expenditures per pupil. A natural extension of this paper would be to empirically
support this answer by including data on educational expenditures in the estimation.
Another way to extend this research would be to take into consideration the type
of TIF districts that are within the school district. Weber, Bhatta, and Merriman (2007)
found both positive and negative spillovers in their research, depending on the type of
TIF district. This may be difficult in school districts with many TIF districts, but could
be controlled for in estimation through a variable that identifies the proportion of all TIF
district property that is of a certain type of TIF district.
In addition, it is important to test for robustness of these results. One could
collect data on other states that are similar to Minnesota during this time period. It would
interesting to contrast these results with data from states that have less TIF use to see if
evidence supports the non-linear effect of TIF on property value growth. Unfortunately,
this may be difficult to do given the dearth of data available on TIF in most states,
especially by school district.
It is also important to recognize the limitations of this paper. In particular, the
results from this paper may not apply to Minnesota today. Data for this paper were from
the years 1992 through 2007. Since then there have been changes in the school finance.
As mentioned in Chapter 5, state funding now represents the majority share of the school
district‟s revenue. Property value does not affect Minnesota‟s school finance as much as
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it once did. Even so, the results can be useful in states that have not moved in this
direction. The results can also be useful in assessing and learning from the past.
Over the years, TIF has been a controversial topic as it relates to school districts.
Many opponents of TIF argue that it takes revenue away from school districts. However,
evidence from this paper does not support that claim. If anything, evidence from this
paper suggests that TIF may actually help school districts raise more revenue, up to a
point. Policymakers in Minnesota and other states should be aware of the non-linear
effect and be open to the idea that TIF may be neither a friend nor a foe, but rather both,
depending on the magnitude of its presence.
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